Lebanon


            In response to the ongoing political stalemate in Lebanon, the Arab League came up with a deal to solve the crisis. I want to discuss the reaction of both Hezbollah and Syria to the deal.

            For its part, Hezbollah wants a deal that ensures it will have enough power to block any threatening legislation. I believe I’ve seen the number “33 percent plus one” batted around, which would make sense given that the passing of legislation requires a 67 percent approval in parliament. Now, lettuce return to the crucial part of that first sentence: “enough power to block…legislation”. Wouldn’t any political organization that subscribes to Realism? Granting such a request to Hezbollah, however, would undermine the already-twisted democratic principles of Lebanon. An increase in the mandated power of Hezbollah’s political wing would come at the expense of the other confessions; and while the lunacy of the confessional style of politics is certainly worthy of another post (or dissertation), it represents the only hope for a stable Lebanon. It cannot and should not be undermined for anyone.

            Another point to chew on is the idea that the Hezbollah spokesman has said that Hezbollah “cautiously welcomes” the deal but will not give the final OK until subsequent events play out. This puts the deal, which many would argue is the best hope for resolving the crisis, in a catch-22 that would only end by giving in to Nasrallah and his lot.

            Syria’s reaction to the deal is also worthy of scrutiny. It has chosen to back, however hesitantly, the Arab League deal. Pundits are arguing that Syrian acceptance is an attempt to ensure the success of the next Arab League summit which is scheduled for March and will be held in Damascus. Such thinking is in line with reports that Syrian Foreign Minister Walid Muallam was warned that King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia would not attend the Damascus meeting if Syria did not back the deal. This development begs the questions of why Syria, which no doubt would like to maintain some control over Lebanon, views the summit with greater importance. What is on the agenda of the next Arab League summit that, apparently, in the eyes of the Assad regime, can supersede Syria’s intentions in Lebanon? Perhaps this position is also meant to be a public display of the recent rapprochement (sort of) between Syria and the U.S.

            Incidentally, by way of underscoring how drawn out this stalemate has been, there have already been 11 attempts (with a 12th scheduled for Saturday) to elect a new president. It’s like the local version of the Writer’s Strike in Hollywood, except more important. Unless you’re “The Insider” or any of those other insipid entertainment shows. And blah blah blah, the final point being that the political crisis in Lebanon ain’t over yet, folks.

My oh my. It’s all a-go over here these days, isn’t it? Not only is Syria abuzz with its warming relations with the U.S. (despite rhetoric from Bush which is probably just talk), but Syria is making headlines with its increasingly poor relations with France. I’ll give you fifty dollars if you can’t guess what they’re bickering about. Yes, shock of shocks, for the first time in what seems like eons, France and the U.S. actually agree on something: Syria’s ties to Lebanon, which both nations view as unnecessary and in violation of Lebanon’s territorial integrity. As soon as I dig up more dirt on why Dr. Bashar has received a Congressional delegation, I’ll pontificate about that. But right now, it’s all about Paris. It seems that relations have gotten so bad between Syria and France that they’re cutting off contact with each other, much as the U.S. did in 2003 in the wake of Hariri’s assassination.

Personally, I find this an interesting development because the fallout over the Hajj assassination last month is becoming complicated. Publicly, the U.S. position remains the same as it has for nearly five years now, being joined by France. At the same time, like I said, Dr. Bashar met with Senator Specter and Congressman Kennedy (if not others) as a sign of rapprochement. At the same time, I continue to hear locally that relations between Syria and Lebanon are at their ziftiest since who knows when, and that Hezbollah is also angry at Assad for allegedly making a deal with America. No doubt, Iran is none too pleased over Syria’s cozying up to the U.S., as well. So basically, at least on some level, everyone’s mad at Dr. Bashar because some other country is going down the tubes. You can’t buy this kind of tension and drama on Grey’s Anatomy, people.

So what happens next? Stay tuned. Over here, our writers aren’t on strike.

 

In a 3 January article, Free Syria mentioned that Hezbollah was planning some demonstrations as well as the closure of the Beirut airport (thankfully after my visit, although I know two Americans who may not be so lucky when they try to leave). Additionally, there has been talk of closing down major ports as well as a 60’s-style sit-in near the U.S. Embassy. All of this is allegedly due to the Maronite Christians’ role in the ongoing political stalemate as well as to U.S. support for the March 14th Movement. Welcome to Beirut 2008 which is starting to look increasingly like the Beirut of 1975 (or perhaps somewhat more optimistically 1974). The only difference being – if memory serves – that thirty years ago, it was the Muslim group in general (or perhaps principally the Sunnis) who wanted a bigger piece of the pie. Now, it’s the Shi’ites turn, no doubt emboldened by the Hezbollah “victory” in last year’s war against Israel.

Anyway, should these events come to pass, there are some troubling issues that need to be addressed. First, the power of Hezbollah. Whether or not one can consider Hezbollah a terrorist organization remains a question of semantics. Personally, I don’t see any reason to contradict the official view of the U.S., although I understand Nasrallah’s counterargument that the IDF is just as culpable. Still, that argument strikes me a lot as a grade school “I’m rubber, you’re glue” argument. Any way you slice it, I don’t feel comfortable with a powerful Hezbollah in Lebanon. I feel even less comfortable when you look at the second issue: exactly how powerful is Hezbollah that they can even seriously consider shutting down Rafiq Hariri International Airport? Is the federal government so weak that it cannot even protect the airport, to say nothing of the ports? The idea that Hezbollah is able to throw its weight around as it pleases is what prompts me to back away from a normally cautious position and see this as the beginnings of the Civil War redux.

The next president of Lebanon (most likely Michel Suleiman) better be able to rule effectively and thoroughly. At the same time, as a country that purportedly practices democracy, the wishes of Hezbollah cannot be overlooked entirely. I think Nasrallah dramatically understates the influence his group has so that he can grab even more power, but part of being a democracy is listening to the opposition. Even in America, we have to listen to the hippies no matter how pot-induced their arguments might be. Whether one acts on those voices is another matter, but everyone deserves a platform. Excluding racists, of course, who sicken the whole of humanity. But that’s a subject for another blog.
As a small side note: perhaps one small measure of Nasrallah’s importance to the Lebanese political scene can be measured by the interview he gave on 3 January. It lasted at least two hours and was carried on at least four channels, including the Syrian TV station.

 

Since my last brief post, I have been hearing much rumblings about changing attitudes in the Middle East. Syria and the U.S. are kissing and making up (albeit probably just modestly), while Syria’s relations with Lebanon are at the lowest they’ve been since the Cedar Revolution. This has caused (according to Watan al-Arabi) anger by Nasrallah who is “ridding his offices of Syrian influence” (or something to that effect). So if Hezbollah isn’t looking north for guidance or whatever, it will be looking east to Iran, which will likely increase its militancy towards Americans.

Of course all of this seems to have transpired whilst I was away for Eid/Christmas in Istanbul. So, upon my return, as I was being driven through Beirut and the rest of Lebanon, I had no idea that it probably wasn’t the best time to be there (beyond the usual words of caution from the State Department). I also have since discovered that it might not have been the best time to be traveling through Lebanon to get to Syria for the reasons mentioned above. This is what happens when wifi isn’t universal, I guess.

Having said that, I had wifi access in Istanbul and still the Christmas Day (or day after) bombing there slipped by unnoticed by me until just a few moments ago. I pretty much stayed in one area (where the English speakers were a-plenty), so I don’t think I was terribly close to the bombing. Truth be told, the most upsetting thing is that that happened without my knowing about it. Of course that may not be too surprising if you know me. I have a reputation for obliviousness, although to be fair, I was the first one where I was staying to hear of the Bhutto assassination. But that’s really neither here nor there.

And while I’m indulging in off-topic irrelevance, let me give a shout out to the Patriots for their perfect season. Pity ASU couldn’t have done the same (or even won their bowl game).

I have to report an accidental play on words in Arabic that I probably should have known ages ago, but just learned of. The Lebanese civil war from 1975-1990 was ended in the Saudi town of Ta’if in meetings which produced what came to be known as the Ta’if Accords. Now, anyone who knows recent Lebanese history also knows that its system of government played a huge role in contributing to the civil war (not to mention the gridlock over finding a successor to the now former president Emile Lahoud). Its system of government mandates representation for what are known as Lebanon’s three main confessions (or sects) – the Maronite Christians, the Sunnis, and the Shi’ites. For my PhD dissertation, I want to write about the effects of confessionalism in Lebanese political evolution. So, it would probably help to know what the word confessionalism is in Arabic. Would you believe it’s “ta’ifiya” (which if you don’t know Arabic grammar is like turning ta’if into an adjective or, in this case, an –ism)?

And thus it makes sense that the Lebanese civil war was ended in an otherwise obscure Saudi town and not somewhere more flashy. Viva los play on words!

President Emile Lahoud (pro-Syrian) is finished on 24 November. That much we know. But who will replace him is as yet unclear. In fact, the Lebanese parliament is - at least according to reports I’ve read - focusing more on international reaction to events in Lebanon than on choosing their next president. Another issue is that the March 14th Coalition (anti-Syrian) are hoping to get a consensus with a simple majority, while the opposition, represented by Nabih Berri, is hoping for a two-thirds consensus.

In a country still deeply affected by the notion of confessionalism introduced by the French when it governed Lebanon, even a simple majority is no simple feat.  This raises concerns that Lebanon could lapse back into civil war. Indeed, with the recent string of assassinations of those parliamentarians identified as anti-Syrian, Lebanon may already be lapsing.

I know someone who visited Beirut in the last couple of weeks and he commented on how tense people were in Beirut, contrasting their demeanor with those of Halabis. Here, life continues to seem normal, even with the Israeli airstrike taken into account. That incident still seems to be playing out behind closed doors rather than escalating into something more serious.